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MOTION OF CHILD USA FOR LEAVE  
TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 Pursuant to Rule 37.2(b), CHILD USA respect-
fully moves for permission to file the attached brief 
amicus curiae. Petitioner has consented to CHILD 
USA’s filing of a brief. In accordance with Rule 37.2(a), 
CHILD USA has provided notice to Counsel for Re-
spondent of CHILD USA’s intent to file a brief. Mark 
E. Chopko, Counsel for the Diocese of Palm Beach, re-
fused consent to CHILD USA’s filing. 
 CHILD USA, the Think Tank for Child Protection, 
is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit think tank that conducts evi-
dence-based legal, medical, and social science research 
to identify, impact, and inform the laws and policies af-
fecting child protection in the United States. With 
these facts, CHILD USA is able to promote ideas, and 
propose effective policy solutions that work to protect 
kids from abuse and prevent childhood neglect. CHILD 
USA draws on the combined expertise of the nation’s 
leading medical and legal academics to reach evidence-
based solutions to the persistent and widespread epi-
demic of child abuse. 
 Sexual abuse and the maltreatment of children 
have an all too frequent impact on children’s health 
and well-being. Every day, millions of children’s civil 
rights are violated in the United States, and due to the 
continued existence of certain statutes of limitations, 
the statutes that are meant to protect them may have 
the perverse effect of protecting only the perpetrator. 
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Although these offenses may occur in secret, behind 
closed doors, they have devastating public conse-
quences for victims, their families, and the public, in 
some cases lasting decades after the violence ends. 
CHILD USA cuts through the shame and secrecy to 
gather and analyze the data behind this type of abuse 
and neglect. All child victims deserve justice, and it is 
CHILD USA’s mission to find a path for them to 
achieve it. 
 We therefore ask this Court to grant certiorari in 
this case and to identify a child-protective rule that 
keeps children from harm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQ. 
Counsel of Record 
CEO & Academic Director 
CHILD USA 
Robert A. Fox Professor of Practice 
University of Pennsylvania 
3814 Walnut St. 
Philadelphia, PA 19104  
(215) 539-1906 
marcih@sas.upenn.edu 
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, ESQ. 
Director of Amicus Advocacy 
CHILD USA 
3701 Chestnut St., 6th Floor 
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BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 With the written consent of the Petitioner filed 
with the Clerk of the Court, CHILD USA, respectfully 
submits this brief as amicus curiae.1 Amicus has 
moved to have this Court accept this brief without the 
consent of the Respondent. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST  
OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Amicus curiae, CHILD USA, conducts evidence-
based legal, medical, and social science research to im-
prove the laws and policies affecting child protection. 
In addition to research, CHILD USA compiles evi-
dence, promotes ideas, and proposes the most effective 
policies to prevent childhood abuse and neglect. With 
these facts, CHILD USA shines a light on the best 
ways to truly protect all children from abuse and ne-
glect. Sexual abuse and the maltreatment of children 
have an all too-frequent impact on children’s health. 
These acts often occur in secret, behind closed doors, 
but have public consequences. Victims, their families, 
and the public pay a high price even decades after the 
violence ends. CHILD USA cuts through the shame 
 
 1 Counsel for amicus curiae authored this brief in whole and 
no other person or entity other than amicus or their counsel has 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. Counsel for both parties were given ten days notice. 
Petitioner granted consent. We move to have this Brief admitted 
by this Court without Respondent’s consent. 
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and the secrecy to gather and analyze the data behind 
abuse and neglect. 
 CHILD USA draws on the combined expertise of 
the nation’s leading medical and legal academics to 
reach evidence-based solutions to persistent and wide-
spread child abuse and neglect. All child victims de-
serve justice, and it is CHILD USA’s mission to find a 
path for them to achieve it. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 This Court needs to state again that religious free-
dom does not protect tortious conduct. Father John 
Gallagher reported a priest, who showed a minor por-
nographic pictures, to the state police. The offending 
priest was subsequently convicted and deported. 
 Instead of celebrating this heroic act of child pro-
tection, Gallagher’s diocese punished him, publishing 
numerous defamatory statements about him. The trial 
court would have heard Gallagher’s defamation law-
suit against the diocese. The Florida appeals court dis-
missed the lawsuit, concluding that a mix of church 
autonomy, ecclesiastical abstention, and the ministe-
rial exception barred the case from being heard. 
 Amicus repeatedly and frequently protects chil-
dren from abuse by religious and non-religious actors. 
Many religious actors hide their wrongdoing instead of 
revealing this abuse. This Court should grant certio-
rari to remind the nation’s courts that religious 
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freedom does not protect illegal conduct like defama-
tion. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This defamation 
case should be decided according to neutral principles 
of law. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 Father John Gallagher correctly reported his new 
assistant priest, Father Joseph Palimatton, to the 
Palm Beach County sheriff ’s office after discovering 
that Father Palimatton had shown pornographic pic-
tures to a 14-year-old boy. Father Palimatton pled 
guilty to possessing and showing pornography to a mi-
nor and was deported to India. Diocese of Palm Beach, 
Inc. v. Gallagher, 249 So. 3d 657, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2018), review denied, No. SC18-865, 2018 WL 4050485 
(Fla. Aug. 23, 2018). 
 There is no question that Father Gallagher cor-
rectly identified a criminal to the police and, as a re-
sult, protected other children from abuse by 
Palimatton. Florida police even praised Father Gal-
lagher’s valuable work on the Palimatton case. One 
sheriff wrote a letter to Sean Cardinal O’Malley, stat-
ing, “Father Gallagher, immediately, took the steps to 
hold the individual responsible and defer any further 
crime that might have been perpetrated against other 
children in the congregation.” App. to Pet. Cert. 52a. 
 Instead of celebrating Father Gallagher as a brave 
whistleblower who had exposed a wrongdoer and kept 
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more children from harm, the Palm Beach Diocese 
punished him and tried to cover up Palimatton’s crime. 
In response, Father Gallagher alleged that the diocese 
had defamed him in numerous ways, including in news 
stories in Florida newspapers and social media posts. 
 The Florida trial court properly rejected the dio-
cese’s ecclesiastical abstention defense, ruling that the 
defamation lawsuit “could be resolved based on neu-
tral legal principles without entangling the courts in 
the interpretation and application of church law, poli-
cies, and practices.” Id. at 658-59. The Florida appeals 
court, however, incorrectly granted the diocese’s writ of 
prohibition. It concluded that the case “cannot be re-
solved without the courts excessively entangling them-
selves in what is essentially a religious dispute.” Id. at 
659. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. Gal-
lagher v. Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc., No. SC18-865, 
2018 WL 4050485 (Fla. Aug. 23, 2018). 
 This case is not a religious dispute. It is a neutral 
legal dispute between religious actors. It is a case 
about the protection of children. State and federal 
prosecutors, judges, and legislators have increasingly 
recognized the need to protect children from religious 
wrongdoers, whether they are ministers who abuse 
children or their superiors who work to systematically 
conceal the misconduct from police. See, e.g., In re For-
tieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 
712 (Pa. 2018). Across the country, thousands of chil-
dren are in danger of abuse by these types of offenders 
whose misconduct may take decades to reveal, a lapse 
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in time that is only amplified by systemic employer 
cover-ups. Id. 
 This Court should grant certiorari in this case to 
clarify that religious freedom does not authorize reli-
gious organizations to defame their brave employees 
who protect children from harm. Father Gallagher’s 
lawsuit involves defamatory statements published 
outside the church, not related to church doctrine, and 
implicating matters of public safety. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at i, Gallagher v. Diocese of Palm 
Beach, No. 18-964, 2019 WL 338905 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
Consequently, it is of vital importance that this Court 
clarify the law, thereby encouraging other ministers to 
come forward and not remain silent for fear of retalia-
tion from their religious employers. As an organization 
devoted to the protection of children’s well-being, we 
urge this Court to allow this case to go to trial based 
on neutral principles of law. 
 
I. This Case Should Be Resolved According 
to Neutral Principles of Law. 
 This Court has long argued that religious actors 
are required to obey neutral laws because the rule of 
law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. 
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court 
should clarify that the neutral principles of law stand-
ard applies to tort cases. Consistent with this Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence, state and federal 
courts have abstained from hearing cases under the 
“ecclesiastical abstention rule” only when the dispute 
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cannot be resolved according to neutral principles of 
law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 
426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) (“Secular courts may, 
however, have jurisdiction over a case involving a 
church if ‘neutral principles of law’ can be applied in 
reaching the resolution.”). For this reason, courts allow 
lawsuits against a Christian seminary to proceed be-
cause the litigation can be resolved according to neu-
tral, non-religious principles of law, just like 
Petitioner’s case here. Id. at 615. See also Galetti v. 
Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1001 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when 
tort and contract claims can be “ ‘resolved by the appli-
cation of purely neutral principles of law and without 
impermissible government intrusion . . . there is no 
First Amendment shield to litigation’ ”) (quoting 
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 852 (N.J. 2002)) (em-
phasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omit-
ted). 
 Respondent and the Florida appeals court mis-
characterized Petitioner’s case as a purely religious 
dispute that the courts cannot adjudicate. The court 
concluded the case was a matter of church autonomy 
and ecclesiastical abstention, even though this Court 
has never identified church autonomy as the proper 
theory of the First Amendment. This argument ignores 
the neutral nature of the defamation tort. In Florida, 
to establish defamation, Father Gallagher must “allege 
and prove the defamatory statement was published, it 
was false, the person who said it must have been acting 
‘with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity,’ 




result of the statement.” Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc. v. 
Gallagher, 249 So. 3d 657, 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2018), review denied, No. SC18-865, 2018 WL 4050485 
(Fla. Aug. 23, 2018) (quoting Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. 
Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)). 
 The Florida court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s case 
deprived him of the opportunity to establish that his 
employer defamed him in describing Father Gal-
lagher’s reporting of certain criminal conduct under-
taken against children. The employer accused Father 
Gallagher of, e.g., making “unfounded allegations,” 
“fabrications,” and “blatantly lying” about the charges 
against Father Palimatton. Cert. Petition at 4-5. Argu-
ments about those claims should be neutrally reviewed 
in the trial court. 
 The trial court is the appropriate place for Re-
spondent to contest the facts of this case, which ended 
on a writ of prohibition. Respondent’s factual response 
confirms the wisdom of a ruling from this Court allow-
ing Petitioner and Respondent to participate in a law-
suit conducted according to the principles of Florida 
tort law, which protects all plaintiffs from defamation, 
whether by a religious or a non-religious actor. 
 This case is about one kind of harm to children. 
Investigations and court decisions repeatedly demon-
strate how thousands of children are endangered by all 
types of abuse. See, e.g., In re Fortieth Statewide Inves-
tigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018). Florida 
law requires reporting child abuse to state authorities. 
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201(1)(c), 39.205(1). 
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Defamation law should not be interpreted to discour-
age reporters of abuse by allowing them to be defamed 
by their employers. It is a legal harm that can be re-
viewed by neutral legal principles. 
 
II. The Florida Court Mistakenly Relied on 
this Court’s Ministerial Jurisprudence to 
Dismiss the Lawsuit. 
 The Florida appeals court also suggested that this 
case should be dismissed because Father Gallagher is 
a minister for ministerial exception purposes. In re-
solving both the church autonomy and ecclesiastical 
abstention “doctrines,” the court noted that such “doc-
trine” 
“ ‘precludes courts from exercising jurisdiction 
where an employment decision concerns a 
member of the clergy or an employee in a min-
isterial position.’ ” Palm Beach, 249 So. 3d at 
661 (quoting Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. 
Minagorri, 954 So. 2d 640, 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007)). 
The appeals court then added: 
Courts may not consider employment dis-
putes between a religious organization and its 
clergy because such matters necessarily in-
volve questions of internal church discipline, 
faith, and organization that are governed by 
ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law. Whether 
an individual is qualified to be a clergy mem-
ber of a particular faith is a matter to be 
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determined by the procedures and dictates of 
that particular faith. 
The interaction between a church and its pas-
tor is an essential part of church govern-
ment. . . . Thus, civil courts must abstain from 
deciding ministerial employment disputes . . . , 
because such state intervention would exces-
sively inhibit religious liberty. Palm Beach, 
249 So. 3d at 661-62 (citing SE Conference 
Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc. v. Den-
nis, 862 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). 
 The court then cited this Court’s decision in  
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), as additional rea-
son to dismiss the suit. The court wrongly concluded 
that Father Gallagher’s dispute was not neutral, due 
in part to his status as a minister. Even though Peti-
tioner’s defamation case involved possible illegal activ-
ity that could be resolved under neutral legal 
principles, the Florida courts dismissed it. 
 In Hosanna-Tabor, this Court “express[ed] no view 
on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types 
of suits, including actions by employees alleging 
breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious 
employers. There will be time enough to address the 
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if 
and when they arise.” 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012). 
 The time is now. Now is the time for this Court to 
clarify that religious freedom, including the ministe-




lawsuits. Defamation cases, and other tort lawsuits, 
should be resolved according to neutral principles of 
law. 
 During this Court’s oral argument in Hosanna- 
Tabor, Justice Sotomayor anticipated cases like Peti-
tioner’s, where important societal interests other than 
the purely internal, ecclesial relationship between a 
church and its ministers are at stake. The Justice 
asked in particular about teachers who are fired for re-
porting sexual abuse to the government. Under the 
Florida court’s reasoning in Petitioner’s case, such law-
suits would be absolutely barred by religious freedom. 
Justice Sotomayor anticipated the serious problems 
with that outcome, asking, “[r]egardless of whether it’s 
a religious belief or not, doesn’t society have a right at 
some point to say certain conduct is unacceptable, even 
if religious . . . ? And once we say that’s unacceptable, 
can and why shouldn’t we protect the people who are 
doing what the law requires, i.e. reporting it?” Tran-
script of Oral Argument at *5, Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 4593953 (U.S.) [here-
inafter Hosanna-Tabor Oral Arg.]. See also Ballaban v. 
Bloomington Jewish Cmty., Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329, 339 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (struggling with the ministerial ex-
ception analysis in a rabbi’s case because the “United 
States Supreme Court has not determined the applica-
bility of the ministerial exception where a minister’s 
employment was terminated or otherwise impacted for 




 This Court should protect the people like Peti-
tioner who do what the law requires. Florida law re-
quires reporting child abuse to state authorities. See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.201(1)(c), 39.205(1). This 
Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment 
does not protect criminal conduct or fraud. See, e.g., 
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“reject[ing] the claim 
that criminal laws against polygamy could not be con-
stitutionally applied to those whose religion com-
manded the practice”); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003) 
(noting, “when nondisclosure is accompanied by inten-
tionally misleading statements designed to deceive the 
listener, the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud 
claim”); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 
147, 164 (1939) (indicating that “[f ]rauds,” including 
“fraudulent appeals . . . made in the name of charity 
and religion,” may be “denounced as offenses and pun-
ished by law”). Petitioner asks this Court to clarify 
that, consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment in other doctrinal areas, religious 
freedom and the ministerial exception do not ban tor-
tious conduct lawsuits when important societal inter-
ests are at stake. Those cases can be resolved according 
to neutral principles of law. 
 In response to Justice Sotomayor’s important 
question, even counsel for Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran 
Church and School acknowledged that the ministerial 
exception should not be absolute: “if you want to carve 
out an exception for cases like child abuse where the 
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government’s interest is in protecting the child, not an 
interest in protecting the minister, when you get such 
a case, we think you could carve out that exception.” 
Hosanna-Tabor Oral Arg. at *6. Counsel then provided 
the “theoretical framework” for the exception re-
quested by Justice Sotomayor: 
First, you have to identify the government’s 
interest in regulation. If the government’s in-
terest is in protecting ministers from discrim-
ination, we are squarely within the heart of 
the ministerial exception. If the government’s 
interest is something quite different from 
that, like protecting the children, then you can 
assess whether that government interest is 
sufficiently compelling to justify interfering 
with the relationship between the church and 
its ministers. But the government’s interest is 
at its nadir when the claim is we want to pro-
tect these ministers as such, we want to tell 
the churches what criteria they should apply 
for – for selecting and removing ministers. 
Id. at *6-7. Amicus respectfully asks this Court to pur-
sue that framework here, in a case that has nothing to 
do with Father Gallagher’s qualifications for ministry 
and everything to do with respecting the government’s 
profound interests in protecting children. 
 Such a balanced and non-absolute approach to the 
ministerial exception would be consistent with this 
Court’s Religion Clause precedents, which have never 
identified religious freedom rights as absolute when 
important governmental and third-party interests are 
at stake. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 
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U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that religious accommoda-
tions must take account of third-party interests); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (same); 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-22 (2005) (indi-
cating that prisoners’ demands under RLUIPA must 
be weighed against the “burden a requested accommo-
dation may impose on nonbeneficiaries” and “meas-
ured so that [they do] not override other significant 
interests”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (stating that religious accommoda-
tions must consider interests of third-party employ-
ees). 
 This Court has always weighed the proposed ac-
tions of First Amendment rights holders against poten-
tial harm to third parties because “[a]t some point, 
accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into 
‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 
(1987)). Moreover, Free Exercise values are equally at 
stake in recognizing that religious employers do not 
enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability. Religious 
freedom and the ministerial exception must not be in-
terpreted inconsistently with this Court’s Free Exer-
cise precedents, which require all citizens, even 
religious ones, to obey neutral laws of general applica-
bility. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court has never granted 
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absolute First Amendment immunity from tort liabil-
ity to a church for violation of a neutral, generally ap-
plicable law. Its doctrine is squarely to the contrary. See 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990); 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
531-32 (1993); Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“ex-
press[ing] no view on whether the [ministerial] excep-
tion bars other types of suits, including actions by 
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious con-
duct by their religious employers”). 
 Moreover, this Court has never extended absolute 
immunity to religious organizations in cases that in-
volve illegal conduct or third-party harm and that may 
be resolved through “neutral principles of law.” Jones 
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). See also Hosanna-Ta-
bor, 565 U.S. at 196. Neither should the courts of Flor-
ida or any other courts extend such immunity to 
religious organizations. 
 On behalf of Petitioner Father John Gallagher, 
Amicus respectfully asks this Court to clarify that his 
employers do not enjoy absolute immunity for his def-
amation. Father Gallagher wants his day in trial court, 
and the opportunity to win or lose his case there based 
on neutral principles of law. We ask you to give him 
that opportunity. 






 Whether church autonomy, the ecclesiastical ab-
stention rule and the ministerial exception of the First 
Amendment bar tort lawsuits is an important issue to 
ministers like Petitioner, whose lawsuit ended on a 
writ of prohibition without any consideration of his du-
ties to obey the law and protect innocent children. 
 For these reasons, the petition for certiorari 
should be granted. 
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